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INTERPRETIVE FREEDOM: A NECESSARY
COMPONENT OF ARTICLE III JUDGING
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ABSTRACT
As judges have debated the best method of constitutional and
statutory interpretation, scholars have begun calling for increased
constraints on the methodological freedoms of Article III judges. This
Note rejects such proposals on constitutional grounds. Drawing upon
the jurisprudence and scholarship on inherent powers, I argue that
interpretive choice is an inherent judicial power. The drafting and
ratification history of Article III demonstrates that the Framers
expected federal judges to interpret the law. To accomplish this task,
however, judges must have some methodological approach to help
them prioritize interpretive evidence. Thus, imposition of a binding
interpretive methodology upon federal judges would pose two
constitutional problems. First, it would infringe the essential judicial
function of interpretive deliberation. Second, it would prevent the
judiciary as a whole from engaging in its most powerful constitutional
check on the excesses of the political branches. Because interpretive
freedom is necessary to the fulfillment of the Article III judicial
function, that freedom must be considered an inherent power vested
in all federal judges.
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INTRODUCTION
Though ostensibly the weakest branch, the federal judiciary is
only growing in importance as the expositor of federal law. The
expansion of modern regulatory programs, in particular, has
generated an increasing number of questions of statutory
1
interpretation for federal judges to answer. Judicial review of such
statutes traces its roots back to Chief Justice Marshall’s famous
2
statement in Marbury v. Madison that “[i]t is emphatically the
3
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
To “say what the law is,” judges rely on a number of interpretive
tools, including not only the text, legislative history, and purpose of a
statute, but also canons of construction and even the consequences of
4
their decisions. To guide their use of these tools, many judges have
adopted personal philosophies of interpretation that privilege some
5
tools at the expense of others. The ensuing debate has found its way
into case law, scholarly literature, and the mainstream media.
6
Despite popular trust in the judiciary, a growing number of
scholars have begun advocating limits on the methodological freedom
of federal judges engaged in constitutional and statutory
7
interpretation. The proposals vary, but they share the common goal
of preventing arguments among federal judges about the best or most
appropriate method of interpretation and, at the same time,

1. I use “federal judges” interchangeably with “Article III judges” throughout this Note.
Because non-Article III judges are of questionable constitutional stature, none of the opinions I
express in this piece should be construed to apply to them.
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Id. at 177.
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. Polls repeatedly show public confidence in the judiciary far surpassing trust in the
president and Congress. According to one Gallup poll, the judicial branch has steadily
outstripped the other two branches in Americans’ trust and confidence since 1974. Frank
Newport, Trust in Legislative Branch Falls to Record-Low 36%, GALLUP (Sept. 24, 2010), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/143225/Trust-Legislative-Branch-Falls-Record-Low.aspx.
7. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1856 (2010)
(“[T]he search may be for a theory of the ‘second best.’ This is important because it shifts the
inquiry away from the idea that there is a single ‘ideal’ way to ascertain the meaning of a
statute—a question much more likely to divide judges and scholars—to, instead, the question of
whether there is a sufficiently satisfying theoretical compromise that will also enhance
coordination and stability in a complex and (for lower courts) overworked legal system.”
(footnote omitted) (citing Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating
Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 232)).
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increasing predictability for litigants and legislators. Although greater
uniformity and predictability in the system offer rule-of-law benefits,
the Constitution imposes structural barriers to achieving that
predictability. One such barrier is the division of powers, which vests
some powers exclusively in particular branches. If an action intended
to bring uniformity of interpretation trespasses on the judiciary’s core
inherent powers, it cannot stand—no matter how well intentioned the
actor may have been. Whether one styles these powers as inherent,
essential, or necessary, they exist to preserve the tripartite system of
8
government that the Framers established.
This Note argues that binding frameworks of interpretation are
inconsistent with the essence of the Article III judicial function and
with judicial independence. My analysis proceeds in three Parts. Part
I provides background information on the scholarship surrounding
interpretive methodologies and the inherent powers of the judiciary.
Part II offers historical evidence that the Framers intended Article III
judges to be independent interpreters of the Constitution and federal
statutes. Part III ties the prior two Parts together by arguing that
every federal judge enjoys a reasonable zone of inherent power to
choose a method of interpretation. This power is a function of both
the federal judge’s task of interpretation and the judiciary’s role as an
independent check on the political branches.
I. BACKGROUND
9

Scholarship on the “judicial Power” is broad and diverse, as
scholars have attempted to derive meaning from the ambiguous text
10
of Article III. Rather than tread too far afield from the aim of this
Note, this Part focuses on the literature regarding inherent judicial
power and interpretive methodologies. Although these areas of
scholarship have developed independently of each other, I believe
they ought to be considered in tandem. Section A discusses the
debate over methods of interpretation and some reactionary
8. See Joseph J. Anclien, Broader Is Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 64
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 74 (2009) (“A key feature of our Constitution’s separation of
powers is that ‘a branch [may] not impair another in the performance of its constitutional
duties.’ Hence, Congress may not behave in a manner that seriously impairs courts’ abilities to
exercise the judicial power, and to exercise that power effectively.” (alteration in original)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996))).
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
10. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 205–06 (1985).
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proposals to limit the power of federal judges to engage in that
debate. Section B considers the scope of inherent judicial power,
which consists of those powers incidental to or necessary for the
11
discharge of the judiciary’s constitutional duties. Bridging the gap
between these two bodies of work, this Note argues that federal
judges have inherent power to develop and implement their own
reasonable philosophies of interpretation.
A. Interpretive Methodologies
12

Methods of interpretation are a hot topic in legal scholarship,
spurring even Supreme Court Justices to weigh in on the correct way
13
to interpret a statutory or constitutional text. Though major cases of
constitutional or statutory interpretation account for only a small
portion of the federal judiciary’s workload, they offer some of the
most substantively interesting challenges. Even after hundreds of
years of jurisprudence, judges face open questions about the scope of
rights protected in the Constitution and the proper balance of power
between the federal government and the states. The United States’
common-law system requires judges to decide these important
questions through case-by-case analysis. Methodology matters. This
Section provides a brief outline of the modern debate over
methodology and then introduces the scholarship that seeks to bind
judges in methodological choice.
1. The Methodological Debate. Legal scholarship proffers many
interpretive methods, but the modern debate is framed by the
dialogue between Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Breyer. In
14
15
16
several books, essays, and debates, these Justices have advocated

11. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 264 (2010).
12. Throughout this Note, I use “methods of interpretation” or “interpretive
methodologies” to refer to broader theories of interpretation such as textualism, originalism, or
purposivism, rather than the methodological tests applied to specific legal issues like First
Amendment challenges.
13. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 7–8 (2005) (articulating six factors upon
which he and other judges may rely in answering questions of interpretation—text, history,
tradition, precedent, purposes or values, and consequences); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 23 (1997) (arguing that judges should look only to a reasonable interpretation
of the text).
14. BREYER, supra note 13; STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK (2010);
SCALIA, supra note 13.
15. E.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845, 848 (1992); Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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divergent approaches to the task of judging. Justice Scalia suggests a
17
textualist approach with limited interpretive tools, whereas Justice
18
Breyer proposes a more fluid, purposivist method. This Subsection
describes the methods of these Justices in detail and then briefly
discusses some of the other methodological options.
Justice Scalia is perhaps the most well-known advocate of
textualism. In his influential essay, A Matter of Interpretation, Justice
Scalia writes, “A text should not be construed strictly, and it should
not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to
19
contain all that it fairly means.” Yet this statement alone does not
separate him from his purposivist colleagues, who also acknowledge
being constrained by text. Rather, what separates him from the
20
purposivists is his focus on the original understanding of a text to the
exclusion of other evidence of its meaning. He is particularly averse
to the use of legislative history, not only because he believes it is an
21
unreliable measure of congressional intent, but also because he
22
fundamentally rejects the entire project of seeking legislative intent.
To Justice Scalia, only the words of a statute have gone through the
23
legislative process, and thus only the words are law. Recognizing
that ambiguity might nevertheless exist on the face of a statute,
Justice Scalia must use some tools of interpretation. Thus, he often

245, 246 (2002); Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View from
the Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 99 (2006); Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address,
Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305, 307 (2004);
Antonin Scalia, Essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989).
16. E.g., Justices Breyer and Scalia Converse on the Constitution, AM. CONSTITUTION
SOC’Y (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/justices-breyer-and-scalia-converse-on-theconstitution; Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and
Stephen Breyer—AU Washington College of Law, Jan. 13, AU NEWS (Jan. 14, 2005), http://
domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7
DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0.
17. SCALIA, supra note 13, at 23.
18. BREYER, supra note 13, at 85.
19. SCALIA, supra note 13, at 23.
20. Id. at 38.
21. See id. at 31–32 (“What is most exasperating about the use of legislative history,
however, is that it does not even make sense for those who accept legislative intent as the
criterion. It is much more likely to produce a false or contrived legislative intent than a genuine
one. The first and most obvious reason for this is that, with respect to 99.99 percent of the issues
of construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent, so that any clues provided by
the legislative history are bound to be false.”).
22. Id. at 31.
23. Id. at 30.
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turns to dictionaries, canons of interpretation, and history in his
analysis. He states, “In textual interpretation, context is everything,
and the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nit-picking
detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow
interpretation—though not an interpretation that the language will
27
not bear.”
Justice Breyer approaches interpretation from a very different
vantage point. Although he recognizes the importance of the text, he
28
also unabashedly embraces a broader role for the interpreting judge.
If the text would lead a court away from the established purpose of
the law, Justice Breyer would expect a judge to reject the literal
29
meaning of the words. He explains,
[J]udicial use of the ‘will of the reasonable legislator’—even if at
times it is a fiction—helps statutes match their means to their overall
public policy objectives, a match that helps translate the popular will
into sound policy. An overly literal reading of a text can too often
30
stand in the way.

To effectuate the will of the legislature, Justice Breyer endorses a set
of six interpretive tools including text, history, tradition, precedent,
31
32
purposes, and consequences. He quotes Justice Frankfurter, who

24. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2008) (using dictionaries to
determine the meaning of “keep and bear Arms” in the Second Amendment).
25. See SCALIA, supra note 13, at 26 (“All of this is so commonsensical that, were the
canons not couched in Latin, you would find it hard to believe anyone could criticize them.”).
26. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801 (invoking history to support the conclusion that the
prefatory clause of the Second Amendment does not limit the operative clause to militia
matters).
27. SCALIA, supra note 13, at 37.
28. See BREYER, supra note 13, at 109–10 (“The discussion has suggested that I, a judge
who has a role in playing the complex score provided me in the form of constitutional and
statutory text, history, structure, and precedent, can perform my role with less discord, more
faithfully to the entire enterprise, and with stronger justification for the power I wield in a
government that is of, by, and for the people, by paying close attention to the Constitution’s
democratic active liberty objective.”).
29. See id. at 85 (“The fifth example . . . . shows how overemphasis on text can lead courts
astray, divorcing law from life—indeed, creating law that harms those whom Congress meant to
help. And it explains why a purposive approach is more consistent with the framework for a
‘delegated democracy’ that the Constitution creates.” (quoting Ahron Barak, Foreword, A
Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 28–29
(2002))).
30. Id. at 101.
31. Id. at 7–8.
32. Id. at 18.
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states, “If the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of
33
meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded.”
Thus, Justice Breyer’s strain of purposivism focuses on understanding
the law in relation to both the people who passed it and the people
who must live with it.
Although textualism and purposivism loosely represent the
major positions in the methodological debate, judicial philosophies
vary considerably within these groups. Some textualists adhere to a
strict constructionist approach, whereas others focus on a more
34
history-driven originalist methodology. Some purposivists may
weigh the tools advanced by Justice Breyer differently, focusing more
35
on legislative history or on their own evaluations of consequences.
For the purposes of this Note, however, one need only understand the
broad strokes of the textualist-purposivist debate that is playing out in
legal scholarship, in Supreme Court cases, and on the political stage.
2. The Desire To Bind Judges. As the debate over interpretive
methodology has continued, some scholars have called for greater
36
constraints on judges. This call may reflect a growing understanding
that methodology can be outcome determinative on important
questions of law. Justices Scalia and Breyer, for example, are known
33. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
541 (1947).
34. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH L. REV. 1509,
1516 (1998) (“Scalia’s position on constitutional interpretation—which rejects an evolving, au
courant Constitution in favor of an originalist, stagnant one—is subtly and perhaps just
tentatively different from his position on statutory interpretation. If the former seeks out the
original meaning of the text, the latter says, with Holmes, ‘I don’t care what [the legislature’s]
intention was. I only want to know what the words mean.’ The former suggests a relatively more
historicist inquiry, the latter a relatively more linguistic one.” (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting SCALIA, supra note 13, at 22–23)).
35. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, for example, would generally be considered purposivists.
Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149, 186 (2001). But
they actually have meaningful differences in jurisprudence. See Saby Ghoshray, To Understand
Foreign Court Citation, 69 ALB. L. REV. 709, 728 (2006) (“[J]urisprudence empowered by
comparative dialogue, emboldened by sharing and learning from across the globe, is the very
basis of Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional interpretation . . . .”); id. at 741 (“Justice Breyer’s
jurisprudence sits at the confluence of contrasting intellectual and philosophical
developments. . . . But, in the end, it is firmly anchored in pragmatic consequentialism, which
will continue to be the hallmark of his jurisprudence.”).
36. See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, Uniformity in Constitutional Interpretation and the
Background Right to Effective Democratic Governance, 63 IND. L.J. 539, 542 (1988) (“It is this
background right to an effective democracy within constitutional limits, the explicit recognition
of which would have a significant effect on constitutional interpretation as a whole, which
provides the foundation for the value of uniformity in constitutional interpretation.”).
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for reaching opposite conclusions on many of the most important
constitutional issues that have been presented during their time
37
together on the Court. Similarly, the ninety-four district courts and
twelve circuit courts routinely produce conflicting decisions.
Professors Henry M. Hart Jr. and Albert M. Sacks crystallize the
problem, noting that “[t]he hard truth of the matter is that American
courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently
38
applied theory of statutory interpretation.” Justices can argue over
interpretation, but there appears to be very little conversion going on
at the Supreme Court.
Scholars have responded to this challenge with different
proposals to establish one methodological framework for
39
interpretation in the federal courts. This solution would not
guarantee uniformity of interpretation in all cases, but it might
improve consistency and predictability in the system as a whole.
Professor Sydney Foster argues that this outcome could be achieved
by applying an “extra-strong” version of stare decisis to doctrines of
40
statutory interpretation adopted by the courts. Foster builds her
argument by analogizing methods of interpretation to choice-of-law
41
rules. Some federal courts have held that when interpreting state
37. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (disagreeing over the
extent to which the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms); Giles v.
California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (reaching opposite conclusions as to whether a defendant
forfeits his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him when his own actions made
the witness unavailable to testify at trial); Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (disputing
whether a state violates the Constitution by refusing a criminal defendant’s request to represent
himself on the ground that he suffered from a mental illness, even though he was found
otherwise competent to stand trial); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (arriving at
different conclusions on whether the Fourth Amendment requires the exclusion of evidence
obtained in violation of the knock-and-announce rule). These citations reflect only those cases
in which Justices Scalia and Breyer filed opposing opinions. They joined opposing opinions in
many other cases, but their own opinions demonstrate most clearly their dueling doctrines.
38. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994).
39. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (“The Court must therefore make the most of the cases it does hear by
issuing broad (maximal) decisions that guide the lower courts in the many cases that it lacks the
capacity to review.”); Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 334 (2004) (arguing that a Restatement of Statutory
Interpretation would provide helpful guidelines for judges confronted with interpretive
questions, much like the Restatement of Contracts has done for judges interpreting contracts).
40. Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1870 (2008).
41. Id. at 1884.
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42

statutes pursuant to the Rules of Decision Act and Erie Railroad Co.
43
v. Tompkins,
those courts must follow state methods of
44
interpretation. The rationales for this move, Foster argues, also
support giving stare decisis effect to methods of interpretation in the
45
federal courts. She suggests that this practice would increase
uniformity in the federal system, force judges to take greater care in
selecting methodology, and make it more difficult for judges to be
46
driven by substantive-law preferences.
Professor Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz takes a different tack—
suggesting that Congress should establish a set of federal rules for
47
statutory interpretation as a public-policy matter. Before offering
this proposal, however, Rosenkranz engages the question whether
particular methods of interpretation may be constitutionally required.
He summarily dismisses the argument of this Note that interpretive
freedom may be an inherent judicial power by stating, “whatever
judicial power exists over interpretive methodology must be common
48
lawmaking power, which may be trumped by Congress.” But
Rosenkranz misconceptualizes interpretive methodology. It is not
common lawmaking, particularly because it has no stare decisis
effect—one of the hallmarks of a working common-law system.
Rather, interpretive methodology is a judge’s method of prioritizing
evidence to come to a decision about the meaning of a statute. This
49
approach is, I argue, the very essence of what it means to be a judge.
Professor Abbe R. Gluck goes one step further than Rosenkranz,
looking to the states as laboratories of experimentation to determine

42. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
43. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
44. Foster, supra note 40, at 1884–85. As Professor Foster herself notes, however, the
Supreme Court precedent on this issue is mixed, id. at 1884 n.119, and Professor Abbe R. Gluck
treats this principle as an open question of law, see infra Section III.A.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1907–10.
47. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085, 2090 (2002).
48. Id. at 2103.
49. Professor Linda Jellum also disagrees with Professor Rosenkranz, offering a similar
argument to the one advanced in this Note. In a brief discussion, she suggests that general
“interpretive directives” are likely to impose an unconstitutional burden on the judiciary’s
deliberative process but that specific directives may be less problematic. Linda Jellum, “Which
Is To Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation
of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 895 (2009). This Note significantly expands that analysis.
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50

the workability of such proposals. Perhaps most interesting is her
Oregon case study, which she calls an “unparalleled example of a
judicially imposed, consistently applied interpretive regime for
statutory cases that remained in place unaltered for a sixteen-year
51
period.” In a unanimous opinion in Portland General Electric Co. v.
52
Bureau of Labor and Industries (PGE), the Oregon Supreme Court
imposed a three-step methodology for all questions of interpretation
53
and then proceeded to follow it strictly for the next sixteen years.
The case set up three tiers of approved sources: first, courts could
look to the text to solve an ambiguity; second, “[i]f, but only if,” the
text failed to provide an answer, courts could look to legislative
history; and third, “[i]f after consideration of text, context, and
legislative history,” the legislative intent is unclear, a court could use
54
general maxims of statutory construction. Several studies indicate
that this methodology successfully curtailed the use of legislative
history, as courts resolved almost all statutory issues on a textual
55
basis. It also brought more cohesion to the Oregon Supreme Court;
between January 2005 and May 2009, fifty-three of the fifty-nine
56
interpretation cases decided by the court were decided unanimously.
Although Oregon seemed to have done the impossible—
seamlessly transition to one coherent system of interpretation for the
state—the Oregon Supreme Court’s efforts did not last. In 2001, eight
years after PGE, the state legislature took steps to bring legislative
57
history into the first step of the PGE framework. The supreme
court, however, ignored the statute and continued to apply PGE for
58
59
another eight years. Finally, in State v. Gaines, the court requested
60
briefing on the framework. The court ultimately produced a

50. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1756. Her five major case studies were Oregon, Texas,
Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Id.
51. Id. at 1776.
52. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143 (Or. 1993).
53. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1775.
54. Id. at 1777 (emphasis omitted).
55. From 1993 to 1998, the Court looked at 137 statutory-interpretation cases, reaching
legislative history thirty-three times and substantive canons only eleven times. Id. at 1779. From
1999 to 2006, the court applied the statutory-interpretation framework 150 times, reaching
legislative history nine times and never reaching the canons of construction. Id.
56. Id. at 1780–81.
57. Id. at 1783.
58. Id.
59. State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042 (Or. 2009).
60. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1784.
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confusing opinion suggesting that legislative history might have a
61
greater role to play in future interpretive decisions. Thus, what was
nearly a tremendous success for a judicially imposed state interpretive
framework displayed its weakness: a need for constant reaffirmation
by the highest court, especially in the face of legislative pressure or
changes in the court’s personnel.
Texas and Connecticut were even less successful in their
attempts at establishing a reliable method of interpretation. Both
states experienced discord between the legislature and the judiciary
over which branch should control methods of interpretation. In
Texas, the legislature passed an act specifically authorizing state
courts to use traditionally purposivist tools—legislative history,
62
consequences, and objectives. Yet the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals actively defied this legislative decision, implementing a rule
prohibiting courts from resorting to tools beyond the text unless the
63
text proved insufficient to resolve the ambiguity. The Texas
Supreme Court has also declined to follow the act when the text is
64
unambiguous. In Connecticut, the state supreme court banned plainmeaning methodology, prompting the legislature to pass a bill
65
expressly requiring its use. Like the high courts in Texas, however,
61. Id.
62. See Code Construction Act, TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2005) (noting
that courts, when engaged in statutory interpretation, may look to extrinsic factors like purpose,
consequences, and legislative history even when the statute’s language is unambiguous).
63. See, e.g., Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“If the plain
language of a statute would lead to absurd results, or if the language is not plain but rather
ambiguous, then and only then, out of absolute necessity, is it constitutionally permissible for a
court to consider, in arriving at a sensible interpretation, such extratextual factors as executive
or administrative interpretations of the statute or legislative history. This method of statutory
interpretation is of ancient origin and is, in fact, the only method that does not unnecessarily
invade the lawmaking province of the Legislature. The courts of this and other jurisdictions, as
well as many commentators, have long recognized and accepted this method as constitutionally
and logically compelled.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 786 n.4 (“Although Section 311.023 of the
Texas Government Code invites, but does not require, courts to consider extratextual factors
when the statutes in question are not ambiguous, such an invitation should be declined for the
reasons stated in the body of this opinion.”).
64. See, e.g., Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 652 n.4 (Tex. 2006)
(“[W]hile the Code Construction Act expressly authorizes courts to use a range of construction
aids, including legislative history we are mindful that over-reliance on secondary materials
should be avoided, particularly where a statute’s language is clear. If the text is unambiguous,
we must take the Legislature at its word and not rummage around in legislative minutiae.”
(citation omitted)).
65. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2003) (“The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance,
be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after
examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
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the Connecticut Supreme Court has continued to treat its precedent
as binding and has interpreted the statute loosely, enabling the court
66
to consult extratextual sources. The courts in these states were
unwilling to suffer legislative interference with their interpretive
67
role.
Additionally, the supreme courts of Wisconsin and Michigan
have introduced interpretive revolutions. In Wisconsin, the court
created a textualist framework—not unlike the one established in
Oregon—to which the state’s purposivist justices have acquiesced and
68
which lower courts have treated as binding precedent. Although
judges have occasionally disputed whether the framework should
apply, the high court led the way to a more consistent interpretive
69
approach. In Michigan, the governor appointed four explicitly
70
textualist justices to a seven-member court. The new majority began
establishing a textualist framework in a series of decisions that have

unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the
meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”).
66. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Nynex Mobile, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue Servs., 869 A.2d 611, 617–
18 & n.13 (Conn. 2005) (“[W]e begin with a searching examination of the language of the
statute, because that is the most important factor to be considered. In doing so, we attempt to
determine its range of plausible meanings and, if possible, narrow that range to those that
appear most plausible. We do not, however, end with the language. We recognize, further, that
the purpose or purposes of the legislation, and the context of the language, broadly understood,
are directly relevant to the meaning of the language of the statute.”).
67. See, e.g., Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 786 n.4 (“[I]nterpretation statutes that ‘seek[] to control
the attitude or the subjective thoughts of the judiciary’ violate the separation of powers
doctrine.” (second alteration in original) (quoting James C. Thomas, Statutory Construction
When Legislation Is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 211 n.85 (1966)));
see also Gluck, supra note 7, at 1796–97 (“Indeed, because the court rarely deems that section 12z applies, it has been able to avoid, for the full six years since its enactment, the question
whether the statute unconstitutionally infringes on judicial authority, despite various hints in
dicta that it might.”).
68. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1800–02; see also State v. Doss, 754 N.W.2d 150, 158 (Wis. 2008)
(“[Q]uestions of statutory interpretation . . . are reviewed de novo under the standards set forth
by [State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 681 N.W.2d 110 (Wis. 2004)].”); Kalal, 681 N.W.2d at 125
(“What is clear, however, is that Wisconsin courts ordinarily do not consult extrinsic sources of
statutory interpretation unless the language of the statute is ambiguous. By ‘extrinsic sources’
we mean interpretive resources outside the statutory text—typically items of legislative
history.”).
69. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1802; see also Lornson v. Siddiqui, 735 N.W.2d 55, 76 (Wis.
2007) (Crooks, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s determination that the statute
was ambiguous and thus subject to extrinsic evidence of its meaning under Kalal).
70. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1803–04.
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71

been treated as precedential, but the project’s political aura may
72
prove to weaken its stature in the long term.
Relying on the general willingness of states to consider the
73
possibility that judges can bind other judges’ methodologies,
Professor Gluck suggests that these experiences provide valuable
74
lessons for the federal system. She emphasizes the benefits of
75
increased uniformity and a sense that judges are “act[ing] like
76
judges.” This comment raises the question, however, of what it
means to act as a judge in the federal system. The next Section
explores one answer to this question through the doctrine of inherent
powers.
B. Inherent Powers
The Supreme Court has recognized, at least in dicta, that each
77
branch of the U.S. government possesses some inherent powers. The
judiciary’s inherent power has been defined as “[a]ll powers, even
71. Id. at 1807; see also, e.g., In re Consumers Energy Co., 761 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2008) (citing the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in In re Complaint of Rovas Against
SBC Michigan, 754 N.W.2d 259 (2008), which rejected application of the Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), framework in state administrative
decisions).
72. Gluck, supra note 7, at 1808–09.
73. Id. at 1823.
74. Id. at 1848.
75. See id. at 1818 (“But why stop at Chevron? The same need for federal law uniformity in
a world of limited Supreme Court review exists with respect to all statutory questions, not just
statutory questions in which there is an administrative agency involved.”).
76. Id. at 1854.
77. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (“Although the source
of the President’s power to act in foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical
gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the
President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.’ While Congress
holds express authority to regulate public and private dealings with other nations in its war and
foreign commerce powers, in foreign affairs the President has a degree of independent authority
to act.” (citation omitted) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 542 (1917) (“Without
undertaking to inclusively mention the subjects embraced in the implied power, we think from
the very nature of that power it is clear that it . . . rests only upon the right of self-preservation,
that is, the right to prevent acts which in and of themselves inherently obstruct or prevent the
discharge of legislative duty or the refusal to do that which there is an inherent legislative power
to compel in order that legislative functions may be performed.”); Ex Parte United States, 242
U.S. 27, 41–42 (1916) (“Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offences
against the criminal laws and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is
judicial, and it is equally to be conceded that in exerting the powers vested in them on such
subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion
to enable them to wisely exert their authority.”).
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though not judicial in their nature, which are incident to the discharge
78
by the courts of their judicial functions.” Professor Joseph Anclien,
however, argues that the judiciary’s inherent powers are significantly
broader—encompassing not only those that are necessary to the
exercise of the judicial power, but also all those that possess a
79
“natural relation” to it.
This Section loosely groups the recognized inherent judicial
80
powers into three categories. First, courts have the inherent power
to control their dockets, complete general housekeeping tasks, and
81
perform a wide range of procedural matters during trial. Second, the
Supreme Court relies on its inherent authority as the head of the
Article III judicial hierarchy to impose procedural rules on the lower
82
federal courts. Third, federal courts have broad discretion to craft
equitable remedies, a discretion that derives from their constitutional
and common-law equity jurisdiction, as well as from their inherent
83
power. Although these are the major categories of inherent powers
that have been officially invoked by the courts, they do not
84
necessarily present an exhaustive list.
1. Control over Procedure Within a Judge’s Own Courtroom.
The first category of recognized inherent power is the authority to
control the day-to-day procedural aspects of one’s courtroom. Judges
exercise this power when they set their dockets, manage parties,
control discovery requests, and even when they stay proceedings. As
78. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 305 (2005).
79. Anclien, supra note 8, at 42.
80. Some scholars have identified alternate groupings. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The
Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 760
(2001) (“Instead of considering inherent authority generally and its relationship to structural
constitutional principles, the Court has examined the exercise of inherent power involved in
each case—usually one aspect of judicial administration, sanctions, or the supervision of
criminal justice.” (footnote omitted)).
81. Anclien, supra note 8, at 44–48.
82. Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987) (“This Court may exercise its inherent
supervisory power to ensure that these local rules are consistent with ‘the principles of right and
justice.’” (quoting In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 554 (1968) (White, J., concurring)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
83. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (“The imposition of sanctions in
this instance transcends a court’s equitable power concerning relations between the parties and
reaches a court’s inherent power to police itself, thus serving the dual purpose of ‘vindicat[ing]
judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court
and mak[ing] the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent’s obstinacy.’”
(alterations in original) (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1977))).
84. See infra Part II.
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the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[T]he power to stay
proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of
85
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Professor
Anclien summarizes a number of cases in which courts have invoked
these powers, including the power to consolidate cases, set the
calendar, dismiss an action under forum non conveniens, and
promote settlement by requiring that parties have someone
86
authorized to settle the case at every pretrial conference. Judges also
exercise authority over evidentiary issues when they set the number
of expert witnesses who may testify, control the admission of exhibits,
decide whether to accept post-trial depositions, and use discovery
87
procedures in habeas cases. As even this brief list demonstrates,
courts invoke their inherent authority to cover a wide range of dayto-day decisions made in the process of judging.
This category of power rests on the necessity rationale first
88
enunciated in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin. There, the Court
said,
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of
justice from the nature of their institution. . . . To fine for
contempt—imprison for contumacy—inforce the observance of
order, &c. are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court,
89
because they are necessary to the exercise of all others . . . .

In presiding over a courtroom, judges must make many decisions
without guidance from a binding statute. They are expected to
manage not only their dockets, but also the parties and actions before
them. The principle is so well established that courts do not even
need to explicitly invoke their inherent power to take these actions,
90
though many do.

85. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
86. Anclien, supra note 8, at 44–45.
87. Id. at 46–47.
88. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
89. Id.
90. See Marinechance Shipping v. Sebastian, 143 F.3d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The district
court possesses the inherent power to control its docket. This power includes the authority to
decide the order in which to hear and decide pending issues.” (citations omitted)); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1012 (5th Cir. 1977) (“‘[T]he
traditional exercise of the court’s inherent powers over the administration and supervision of its
own business’ . . . . is not merely desirable. It is a critical necessity. The demands upon the
federal courts are at least heavy, at most crushing.” (quoting MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d
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Unsurprisingly, these limited powers have generated little
scholarly comment beyond the recognition that they serve valuable
functions in the judicial system. Professor Robert Pushaw, for
example, calls them “implied indispensable powers” because courts
91
need them to function competently. He argues that these powers are
so central to the judicial process that the Constitution permits only
92
legislation that would facilitate the exercise of these powers.
Similarly, Professor William Van Alstyne expresses concern about
the expansion of judicial authority, but he acknowledges a “core of
powers that are indispensable . . . to the performance of [judges’]
93
express duties under [Article III] of the Constitution.”
2. Supervisory Authority. A more controversial zone of inherent
powers is the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority over lower court
procedure. The Court first claimed the power to review inferior court
procedure in 1943, stating that “[j]udicial supervision of the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the
duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure
94
and evidence.” Since that time, the Court has varied its definition of
95
this power. As the Court framed it in Frazier v. Heebe, “This Court
may exercise its inherent supervisory power to ensure that these local
96
rules are consistent with ‘the principles of right and justice.’” In
97
Dickerson v. United States, however, the Court moved beyond mere
oversight of local rules, using its supervisory authority to justify the
creation of binding rules of evidence and procedure for lower federal
98
courts.

65, 69 (2d Cir. 1958))); MacAlister, 263 F.2d at 68 (“But even if the rule were more restricted in
its scope we would be most reluctant to deny such inherent power to the district courts. The
power to order consolidation prior to trial falls within the broad inherent authority of every
court . . . .”).
91. Pushaw, supra note 80, at 847.
92. Id. at 742.
93. William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the
President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping
Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 107 (1976).
94. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1942).
95. Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1986).
96. Id. at 645 (quoting In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 554 (1968) (White, J., concurring))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
98. Id. at 437.
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The major justification for supervisory authority rests on the
Supreme Court’s position in the judicial hierarchy. In a compromise
at the Constitutional Convention, Article III established one
“supreme” court and left the creation of future “inferior” courts to
99
the discretion of Congress. The Constitution does not describe this
division further, but the Supreme Court has developed into a
powerful and prestigious body that serves as the final arbiter of
federal law.
Although the Supreme Court has been vague about the
justification for its supervisory authority, Professor Sara Sun Beale
argues that the justification likely rests with the implied or ancillary
100
powers of the courts. She analogizes these powers to the implied or
ancillary powers of the executive, noting that
the textual differences between articles II and III suggest, if
anything, that the argument for a generous interpretation of the
judiciary’s implied powers is stronger than the President’s claim
under article II. The narrow Madisonian view of the President’s
powers can readily be implied from the enumeration of detailed
powers in article II. No similar enumeration of judicial powers is
101
found in article III . . . .

Beale would not call this power an “inherent” power because it can
102
be abrogated by congressional statute.
The Supreme Court,
103
however, has invoked the term “inherent” to describe this power.
Several Supreme Court Justices have explicitly questioned what
appears to be a growing exercise of supervisory authority. In Frazier,
a case involving district court rules of admission to the bar, thenJustice Rehnquist called the reliance on supervisory authority
104
“newfound and quite unwarranted.” In another case reviewing a
lower court’s exercise of supervisory authority to dismiss an

99. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
100. Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1471–72
(1984).
101. Id. (footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 1467–68.
103. See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1986) (“This Court may exercise its inherent
supervisory power to ensure that these local rules are consistent with ‘the principles of right and
justice.’” (quoting In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 554 (1968) (White, J., concurring)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
104. Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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indictment for misconduct, Justice Scalia stated that he did not “see
105
the basis for any direct authority to supervise lower courts.”
Relatedly, some scholars have challenged the prudence and
constitutionality of supervisory authority. Professor Beale concludes
that “supervisory authority,” as invoked by the Supreme Court,
actually refers to a number of different forms of authority, not all of
106
which are within the Court’s constitutional competence. When the
Court acts without statutory authority, Beale argues that it should
exercise its supervisory authority narrowly, establishing rules only for
“matters relating to the efficiency and reliability of the judicial
107
process.” Professor Amy Coney Barrett has also explored the
constitutional basis for supervisory authority, ultimately concluding
108
that it is in “significant tension” with the structure of Article III. She
notes that even if one could reasonably conclude that the supremeinferior distinction called for a judicial hierarchy, and that the word
109
“supreme” conveyed inherent authority, one must also find that this
inherent authority extended to the control of inferior court
110
procedure. Barrett argues that the ambiguity of the text, combined
with a sparse historical record, weighs heavily against supervisory
111
authority’s claim to constitutional legitimacy.
Though he does not specifically address the supervisory-power
doctrine, Professor David Engdahl also challenges its underpinnings
by arguing that the constitutional text does not mandate the current
112
judicial hierarchy. Relying heavily on the history of state judiciaries
and the ratification compromise, Engdahl argues that the supremeinferior distinction implies no hierarchy at all, requiring only that the
Supreme Court have the widest geographic and subject-matter
113
jurisdiction. In his view, the “supreme Court” could theoretically be
reviewed by “inferior Courts” and still meet its constitutional
105. Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 264 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
106. Beale, supra note 100, at 1520.
107. Id.
108. Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 324, 364 (2006).
109. This claim is dubious, according to Professor Barrett, who sees the distinction between
“supreme” and “inferior” courts as a limit on congressional establishment of further courts
rather than as a grant of special supervisory power to the Supreme Court. Id. at 387.
110. Id. at 365.
111. Id. at 371.
112. David E. Engdahl, What’s in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple “Supreme”
Courts, 66 IND. L.J. 457, 491 (1991).
113. Id. at 467–68.
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114

requirements. If accepted, this argument would effectively erode the
hierarchical justification for supervisory authority. Despite the
existence of scholarship challenging the supervisory-power doctrine,
the Court continues to rely upon it when promulgating procedural
rules for the lower federal courts.
3. Equitable Powers. The third major category of inherent or
implied Article III powers is equitable power. As the Supreme Court
has defined it, “The essence of a court’s equity power lies in its
inherent capacity to adjust remedies in a feasible and practical way to
eliminate the conditions or redress the injuries caused by the unlawful
115
action.” Several good arguments exist, however, for rejecting the
categorization of equitable powers as “inherent.” First, the judiciary’s
equitable powers are explicitly authorized by the text of the
Constitution. Article III, Section 2 declares that “[t]he judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
116
which shall be made, under their Authority.” Second, equitable
powers are not per se necessary to the resolution of a great many
cases. Nevertheless, federal courts have cited “inherent” equitable
117
powers to justify a number of procedural and remedial decisions.
The justification for inherent equitable powers is grounded in the
English tradition of equity courts. Rather than establish separate
courts of law and equity under Article III, the Framers adopted a
unified approach in which all federal courts could sit in either law or
114. See id. at 468–72 (noting that Virginia, Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
North Carolina, and Georgia lacked pyramid-style judicial systems at the time of ratification).
115. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487 (1992).
116. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
117. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1972) (“Although the traditional American rule
ordinarily disfavors the allowance of attorneys’ fees in the absence of statutory or contractual
authorization, federal courts, in the exercise of their equitable powers, may award attorneys’
fees when the interests of justice so require. Indeed, the power to award such fees ‘is part of the
original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,’ and federal courts do
not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power . . . .” (footnotes omitted) (citation
omitted) (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939))); Inland Steel Co. v.
United States, 306 U.S. 153, 156 (1938) (“A court of equity ‘in the exercise of its discretion,
frequently resorts to the expedient of imposing terms and conditions upon the party at whose
instance it proposes to act. The power to impose such conditions is founded upon, and arises
from, the discretion which the court has in such cases, to grant, or not to grant, the injunction
applied for. It is a power inherent in the court, as a court of equity, and has been exercised from
time immemorial.’” (quoting Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 438 (1881))); Calloway v. Dobson,
4 F. Cas. 1082, 1083 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 2325) (citing the circuit
court’s equitable power to permit parties to amend pleadings).
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118

equity. This choice effectively imported some English notions of
equitable powers into the American judicial system. The Supreme
Court explicitly recognized this fact in Atlas Life Insurance Co. v. W.I.
119
Southern, Inc. :
The “jurisdiction” thus conferred on the federal courts to entertain
suits in equity is an authority to administer in equity suits the
principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised
and was being administered by the English Court of Chancery at the
120
time of the separation of the two countries.

These equitable powers became universally available—and thus more
pervasive—when the systems of law and equity were merged in
121
1938. But jurists disagree over the extent to which equitable
principles have continued to develop in American history or remain
122
as frozen-in-time testaments to the English system circa 1783. For
this Note’s purposes, it is sufficient to note that equitable judicial
powers enjoy a long and respected history within the judiciary.
Given this well-established relationship between judges and
equity, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Supreme Court has been
extremely reluctant to find its equitable powers constrained.
Professor William Eskridge notes that the Supreme Court, when
engaging in statutory interpretation, “may . . . presume that Congress
does not intend to strip federal courts of their inherent powers,
123
especially their power to fashion creative relief in equity.” The
Court has also repeatedly affirmed the breadth of its powers to
124
fashion equitable remedies. In the course of jealously guarding its
equitable powers, the Court has made a powerful statement of its
118. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity . . . .”).
119. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563 (1938).
120. Id. at 568.
121. See Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Transformed: Preliminary Injunctions To Require the
Payment of Money, 70 B.U. L. REV. 623, 653–54 (1990) (“Like their English counterparts, early
American courts refrained from granting equitable remedies if adequate remedies at law
existed. When law and equity were merged into a unitary system in 1938, the historical reason
for judicial restraint in granting equitable relief disappeared: two competing judicial systems no
longer existed.” (footnotes omitted)).
122. Richard H.W. Maloy, Expansive Equity Jurisprudence: A Court Divided, 40 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 641, 642 (2007).
123. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1023 (1989) (omission in original).
124. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1132 (1996).
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resistance to infringements on authority it views as inherent to its
office.
II. THE FRAMERS’ VISION OF INDEPENDENT JUDGES ENGAGED IN
INTERPRETATION
Inherent judicial powers have been defined in an ad hoc manner,
elaborated whenever such powers prove necessary to protect a
judge’s role in the system. Despite the growing push for control over
methodology, courts have not had occasion to consider whether a
judge’s methodological choices might be considered an inherent
power and, if so, the extent to which they can be abrogated. This Part
begins to answer this question by considering the Framers’ vision of
the function of federal judges. First, I argue that the Framers sought
to insulate federal judges from outside pressure that could affect the
independent adjudication of cases and controversies. Second, I
describe the expectation of the Framers that these judges would
engage in constitutional and statutory interpretation.
A. Federal Judges as Independent Arbiters
The text of the Constitution establishes important protections for
the independence of judges. Article III, Section 1 provides, “The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
125
their Continuance in Office.” These provisions ensure both financial
and job security for federal judges. They were aimed at combating the
undue influence of the executive and legislative branches on federal
judges.
126
Although the Framers agreed on the major proposals, they
disagreed over the possibility of locking salaries at the level of
appointment. The initial draft of the Constitution took this tack, but
Gouverneur Morris submitted a proposal to strike that provision to
allow salaries to increase with the changing circumstances of the
127
nation. James Madison dissented, suggesting that this proposal

125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
126. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 38 (Max Farrand ed.,
2d. ed. 1937) (noting that the amendments to permit judges to serve in “good Behaviour” and
with a fixed salary passed unanimously).
127. Id. at 44.
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128

made judges dependent upon the legislature. He preferred to tie
judicial salaries to a specific standard such as the price of wheat to
129
remove even the possibility of legislative control. The Framers
shared Madison’s concern regarding the independence of the new
federal judges, but they were worried that tying judicial salaries to the
130
price of wheat might actually backfire as the country changed.
131
Although Madison lost the battle to tie salaries to a fixed standard,
the exchange nevertheless reveals the Framers’ efforts to craft
constitutional provisions that would insulate judges from undue
132
influence over their work.
133
Many of the Framers were trained in the law, so unsurprisingly,
the Constitution’s protections of judicial independence reflect
broader legal opinions of the time. Timothy Cunningham’s 1771 law
dictionary shared the following anecdote:
The judge at his creation takes an oath that he shall indifferently
minister justice to all them that shall have any fruit or plea before
him, and this he shall not forbear to do, though the King by his
letters, or by express word of mouth, should command the
contrary . . . . King Henry the Fourth, when his eldest son the Prince
was by the Lord Chief Justice, for some great misdemeanors,
committed to prison, thanked God that he had a son of that

128. Id. at 45.
129. Id.
130. See id. (recording Morris’s reply that there should be flexibility to increase judges’
salaries as their workload grew and society changed, a flexibility that could not be achieved by a
salary tied to the price of wheat).
131. Id. On the motion for striking the words “or increase” from the drafted salary
protections, there were six “[a]yes,” two “noes,” and one abstention. Id.
132. For further historical analysis and support on this point, see generally James S.
Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998); and Jack N.
Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061 (2007). For a
textual analysis of the independence protections, see generally Martin H. Redish, Judicial
Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the Constitution: A Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 673 (1999).
133. Thirty-five of the fifty-five delegates to the Constitutional Convention were lawyers,
though not all of them practiced law as their main occupation. Some of the Framers were even
judges themselves. The Founding Fathers: A Brief Overview, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.
archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers_overview.html (last visited Nov. 9,
2011).
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obedience, and a judge so impartial, and of such undaunted
134
courage . . . .

This commentary emphasizes the importance of a judge’s
independent decisionmaking, especially in the face of external
pressures. Giles Jacob’s English law dictionary—published in London
in 1729 and in America in 1811—similarly describes an independent
judiciary with tenure in good behavior, salary protections, and
135
insulation from injury or punishment.
These dictionaries
demonstrate a growing consensus that the independence of judges
was a critical feature of a working judiciary.
During the ratification period, Alexander Hamilton touted the
benefits of these judicial protections. In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton
wrote,
The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the
judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the
modern improvements in the practice of government. . . . And it is
the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to
136
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.

Hamilton’s words appear to echo a consensus at the Constitutional
Convention and among the broader legal community at the time that
judges should have sufficient insulation from the other branches of
government.
B. Federal Judges as Interpreters of Federal Law
Although the Framers were explicit about judicial protections,
they did not clearly outline the duties of a federal judge. The closest
analogue to the enumeration of powers and duties of Congress in
137
Article I is the jurisdictional grant of Article III, Section 2. This
provision defines only the scope of judicial power, however, not the
functions of federal judges. Despite this lack of textual instruction,
the Constitution’s drafting records and ratification history provide
strong support for the conclusion that the Framers expected the
134. 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY, at JUB JUD
(London, His Majesty’s Law Printers 2d ed. 1771).
135. 2 GILES JACOB, THE LAW-DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND
PRESENT STATE, OF THE ENGLISH LAW, IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, at ISSUE. JUDGES. –
JUDGES. JUDGMENT. (T.E. Tomlins ed., London, His Majesty’s Law Printers 1797).
136. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
137. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (outlining nine jurisdictional grants for the federal
judiciary).
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federal judiciary to engage in constitutional and statutory
138
interpretation.
The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal repeated
invocations of the judiciary’s power to interpret. When debating the
potential for a “Council of Revision” made up of the executive and
judiciary to “overrule” legislative acts, Elbridge Gerry noted that the
139
judiciary did not need to be a part of such a council. According to
Madison’s notes from June 4, 1787, Gerry asserted that the judiciary
“[would] have a sufficient check [against] encroachments on their
own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a
power of deciding on their Constitutionality. In some States the
Judges had actually set aside laws as being [against] the Constitution.
140
This was done too with general approbation.” Similar comments
were made in later discussions on the subject throughout the
141
summer.
While discussing the Council of Revision, the Framers repeatedly
raised two objections to judicial participation that reflect a
widespread assumption that judges would engage in statutory
interpretation. First, the council’s opponents contended that the
judiciary did not need to participate in the proposed legislative
142
“negative” because they could declare laws unconstitutional later.
Second, they maintained that participation in such a council would
143
bias the judges in their later adjudicatory duties. The thrust of these
arguments was that the judiciary’s evaluation of legislation would
take place at a later time. Once the judiciary’s position in the Council

138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 136, at 394.
139. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 126, at 97–98.
140. Id. at 97 (emphasis omitted).
141. See id. at 108–09 (recording John Dickinson’s commentary that “[t]here is a
Difference—the Judges must interpret the Laws[;] they ought not to be legislators”); id. at 109
(“Mr. King was of opinion that the Judicial ought not to join in the negative of a Law, because
the Judges will have the expounding of those Laws when they come before them; and they will
no doubt stop the operation of such as shall appear repugnant to the constitution.”); 2 id. at 73–
80 (summarizing further objections raised to having the expositor of laws participate in a
Council of Revision).
142. See, e.g., 2 id. at 76 (“And as to the Constitutionality of laws, that point will come
before the Judges in their proper official character. In this character they have a negative on the
laws. Join them with the Executive in the Revision and they will have a double negative.”).
143. See, e.g., id. at 75 (“Mr. Strong thought with Mr. Gerry that the power of making ought
to be kept distinct from that of expounding, the laws. No maxim was better established. The
Judges in exercising the function of expositors might be influenced by the part they had taken,
in framing the laws.”).
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144

of Revision failed, the president’s veto took the place of a Council
145
of Revision as a way to disapprove congressional action.
Ratification history also supports the conclusion that those
ratifying the Constitution were aware that the judiciary was expected
to engage in both constitutional and statutory interpretation. Writing
as Publius in The Federalist Papers, Hamilton said, “The
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is . . . a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to
[judges] to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any
146
particular act proceeding from the legislative body.” Similarly,
James Wilson, one of Pennsylvania’s delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, told his home state’s ratification convention:
[I]t is possible that the legislature . . . may transgress the bounds
assigned to it, and an act may pass, in the usual mode,
notwithstanding that transgression; but when it comes to be
discussed before the judges,—when they consider its principles, and
find it to be incompatible with the superior power of the
Constitution,—it is their duty to pronounce it void; and judges
independent, and not obliged to look to every session for a
continuance of their salaries, will behave with intrepidity, and refuse
147
to the act the sanction of judicial authority.

Such statements were made to the public and to the legislators who
would vote on a state’s ratification of the proposed Constitution.
Thus, those voting on the Constitution were unlikely to be in doubt
about the intentions of the Framers on the matter of judicial
interpretation of the laws.
The critique of this position generally centered on the lack of
textual support for the power, rather than on concerns about the
judiciary’s exercise of the power. In the Virginia ratification debates,
Patrick Henry lauded Virginia’s judges for standing against the
unconstitutional acts of the state legislature, but he expressed concern
that the Constitution lacked a textual landmark for the exercise of

144. Id. at 80 (recording the failure of the motion, with three “[a]yes,” four “noes,” and two
states divided).
145. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring a presidential signature for a bill to become
law, or a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress to override a presidential veto).
146. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 136, at 394.
147. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 446 (photo. reprint 1996) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891).
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this power at the federal level. He asked rhetorically if Madison was
sure that the judiciary would stand against the legislature, without any
149
explicit authority to do so. Despite some legislators’ unease with the
lack of textual support, the ratification debates reveal repeated
assertions by the pro-Constitution drafters that constitutional and
statutory interpretation would indeed be a task for the judiciary.
Under these circumstances, it might seem surprising that there is
no evidence that the Framers discussed which tools would be
appropriate for judges engaging in interpretation. After all, the task
asks judges to make subjective judgments about what evidence is
relevant and what persuasive value one should attach to it. This
approach was not a unique concept in law, as the English common150
law system relied on a similar process for statutory interpretation.
The Framers did not, however, define parameters or rules for the
interpretation of the Constitution and federal statutes. The
conspicuous absence of any debate on the subject suggests the
Framers assumed that judges would continue to use the same tools
and procedures traditionally invoked under English law in such
151
cases.
III. ARTICLE III JUDICIAL POWER AS A SOURCE OF AUTHORITY
OVER METHODOLOGY
The preceding Part described the Framers’ vision for Article III
judges as independent arbiters ready to stand against the more
dangerous political branches on questions of interpretation. The next
step is to consider this vision’s compatibility with constraints on
judicial methodology. This Part argues that courts cannot

148. 3 id. at 325.
149. Id.
150. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430–32 (“But there is not a single rule
of interpreting laws, whether equitably or strictly, that is not equally used by the judges in the
courts, both of law and equity : the construction must in both be the same : or, if they differ, it is
only as one court of law may also happen to differ from another. Each endeavours to fix and
adopt the true sense of the law in question . . . .”).
151. Professor William Eskridge Jr. has conducted a lengthy historical analysis of Foundingera understandings of interpretive tools. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early
Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 990 (2001). He writes that the Framers were at least familiar with, and understood the
importance of, the canons of statutory construction. Id. at 1099–1100. This conclusion lends
further support to my argument that the Framers would have expected judges to proceed as
judges had always done, with substantial freedom to employ the varied tools of statutory
construction.
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meaningfully implement the structure established by the Framers if
152
judges are constrained in their methodological choices. This thesis
encompasses two arguments. First, methods of interpretation are
intimately connected to the deliberation that is essential to judging.
Second, judicial independence from the other branches cannot
tolerate a binding methodological framework. Because a reasonable
zone of freedom is necessary to the fulfillment of the constitutionally
established judicial role, this freedom must be considered an inherent
power of all federal judges.
A. Interpretive Deliberation as an Essential Judicial Function
Interpretation of the laws is one of the judiciary’s most important
constitutional duties. Although all governmental actors may, and
should, consider the constitutionality of the tasks they undertake, the
judiciary has always served as the final interpreter. The supporters of
153
the Constitution argued during the ratification debates that it was
appropriate for Article III judges to assume this role, and judges have
steadily maintained this function ever since. Perhaps the most famous
defense of this power came in Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78. After
assuring the public that the judiciary would always be the least
154
dangerous branch, Hamilton proceeded to argue that judicial review
was necessary not only to ensure the constitutionality of the laws but
155
also to check those who would make mischief. The subsequent
history is well known: the Constitution was ratified and, fifteen years
later, Chief Justice Marshall took up the mantle of judicial review in
Marbury. In order to engage in this essential judicial task, judges must
adopt some method of interpretation. This Section demonstrates the
ways in which interpretive methodology is distinct from procedural
rules and substantive laws but is intimately connected to the heart of
the judicial interpretive function.

152. I do not suggest that a judge experiences no constraint on his choices. The “good
Behaviour” shield could easily become a sword to be used against a judge whose methodology
defies legal conventions or craft.
153. See supra Part II.B.
154. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 136, at 392.
155. Id. at 396 (“[T]he firmness of the judicial magistracy . . . . not only serves to moderate
the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon
the legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous
intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the
very motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts.”).
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Interpretation is best conceptualized as a matter of judicial
156
“craft.” Immanuel Kant’s theory understands judgment as “learned
157
but not defined.” Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that so many
158
The
judges have compared their role to that of the artist.
interpretive task involves aggregating, processing, and prioritizing
159
information, but it also involves a great deal of judgment. As thenProfessor—later Second Circuit judge—Jerome Frank explains, “The
160
law is not a machine and the judges not machine-tenders.” Rather,
judges must bring to bear their experience, their thoughtfulness, and
161
even their instincts. Evaluating judgment in the context of business
lawyering, Professor Jeffrey Lipshaw notes that judgment is an
exercise of the mind that is mysterious precisely because it is neither

156. See Gluck, supra note 7, at 1849 (dismissing objections to methodological frameworks
based on arguments of judicial “craft” as susceptible to the rejoinder that all law is craft).
157. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments, 41 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 268–69 (Paul
Guyer & Allen Wood trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (1787)).
158. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 63 (2008) (“Norms govern the
various art genres, just as norms govern judicial decisions—and in both cases the norms are
contestable. Manet could not paint as well, in the conventional sense, as his teacher, Couture;
but in the fullness of time Manet became regarded as much the greater painter. Holmes,
Brandeis, Cardozo, and Hand are examples of judges who succeeded by their example in
altering the norms of opinion writing.”); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 530 (1947) (“When one wants to understand or at least get the
feeling of great painting, one does not go to books on the art of painting. One goes to the great
masters. And so I have gone to great masters to get a sense of their practise of the art of
interpretation. However, the art of painting and the art of interpretation are very different
arts.”).
159. Then-Professor Easterbrook suggests that judges should be more willing to admit that
there is no answer—that a given statute cannot be construed to answer the same question, thus
returning the problem back to the legislature. Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and
the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 99 (1984). Easterbrook says that
interpretation of words is hard even with years to study a document written by a single person,
but that the challenges are only magnified by the legislative process. Id. at 87–88. According to
Easterbrook, judges should refuse to offer an interpretation unless the statute clearly transfers
authority to the courts to make common law on the issue. Id. at 92–94.
160. JEROME N. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 120 (1930).
161. See, e.g., Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
“Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929) (“I, after canvassing all the
available material at my command, and duly cogitating upon it, give my imagination play, and
brooding over the cause, wait for the feeling, the hunch—that intuitive flash of understanding
which makes the jump-spark connection between question and decision, and at the point where
the path is darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its light along the way.”). Hutcheson Jr. served as a
federal district judge for the Southern District of Texas from 1918 to 1931, when he became a
Fifth Circuit judge—a position he held until his death in 1973. Biographical Directory of Federal
Judges: Hutcheson, Joseph Chappell Jr., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGet
Info?jid=1136&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
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algorithmic nor random. Over time, a judge will gain a wealth of
experience to assist in this endeavor. He may also develop a
philosophy about the type of evidence that most accurately reflects a
163
judge’s role in the system.
The mechanism of applying a methodology may look procedural,
but the philosophical considerations entwined with the procedural
aspects make that label an ill fit. A judge’s philosophy of
interpretation is inextricably connected to his processing of
information and his determination of its persuasiveness. Justice Scalia
privileges text, history, and precedent when interpreting law because
164
he views himself as lacking the authority to look beyond those tools.
Similarly, Justice Breyer looks to purposes, consequences, and other
tools less bound to text because he believes that the Constitution’s
165
democratic imperative mandates his doing so. Other judges have
similarly tied their methods of interpretation to broader ideas about
166
the role of judges in the system.

162. Lipshaw, supra note 157, at 12–14.
163. For an interesting theoretical article about how rational judges select their interpretive
methods, see Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769 (2008).
Professor Volokh suggests that interpretive methods are only constraining to the extent that
judges must stay within the bounds of plausibility. Id. at 795.
164. See SCALIA, supra note 13, at 23 (“To be a textualist in good standing, one need not be
too dull to perceive the broader social purposes that a statute is designed, or could be designed,
to serve; or too hidebound to realize that new times require new laws. One need only hold the
belief that judges have no authority to pursue those broader purposes or write those new
laws.”).
165. See BREYER, supra note 13, at 6 (“But my thesis reaches beyond these classic
arguments. It finds in the Constitution’s democratic objective not simply restraint on judicial
power or an ancient counterpart of more modern protection, but also a source of judicial
authority and an interpretive aid to more effective protection of ancient and modern liberty
alike.”).
166. See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 158, at 533–34 (“[Judges] are confined by the nature
and scope of the judicial function in its particular exercise in the field of
interpretation. . . . There are varying shades of compulsion for judges behind different words,
differences that are due to the words themselves, their setting in a text, their setting in history.
In short, judges are not unfettered glossators.”); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (“The judge who
recognizes the degree to which he is free rather than constrained in the interpretation of
statutes, and who refuses to make a pretense of constraint by parading the canons of
construction in his opinions, is less likely to act wilfully than the judge who either mistakes
freedom for constraint or has no compunctions about misrepresenting his will as that of the
Congress.”); see also Albert M. Sacks, Felix Frankfurter, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 1199, 1200 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997) (“The nature
of the issues which are involved in the legal controversies that are inevitable under our
constitutional system does not warrant the nation to expect identity of views among the
members of the Court regarding such issues, nor even agreement on the routes of thought by
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To order a judge to consider—or not to consider—particular
types of evidence is to mandate a philosophy of interpretation. Doing
so would make it impossible for some judges to fulfill their oath to
167
uphold the Constitution. Textualists like Justice Scalia, if forced to
focus on purposes and consequences, would believe that they were
168
exceeding their constitutional authority. Purposivists like Justice
Breyer, if forced to abandon their traditional tools, would feel that
they were ignoring their constitutional mandate to interpret laws to
169
fulfill congressional purpose. Considered in this light, methodology
is best viewed not as a procedural rule but rather as a theoretical
approach that cannot and should not be reduced to a codified
170
“Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation.”
Some critics might argue that methodological constraints would
not produce a constitutional dilemma because all of the proffered
approaches to statutory construction are constitutional. Given that no
one has attempted to impeach a Supreme Court Justice for looking or
not looking at particular pieces of evidence, it seems likely that all of
the major methods of interpretation are indeed constitutional. But
the key here is not whether all of these methodologies are, in fact,
legitimate, but whether the judge himself views his actions as
legitimate. If not, the judge cannot be considered to have upheld his
oath. Oaths are individual affirmations, relying upon one’s conscience
and personal judgment, in addition to one’s awareness of the broader
societal consensus on a matter. Even if a judge could not be
impeached for violating his personal view of the Constitution—as
opposed to the public view—one might expect outright defiance or

which decisions are reached. The nation is merely warranted in expecting harmony of aims
among those who have been called to the Court.” (emphasis added) (quoting Retirement of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, 371 U.S. vii, x (1962))).
167. See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006) (“I, _______ _______, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich,
and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon
me as _______ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.”).
168. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
170. But see Rosenkranz, supra note 47, at 2157 (“This Article endorses a Canons Enabling
Act on the same model and a coherent set of canons to bring order to statutory interpretation,
just as the Rules have brought order to procedure and to evidence. This set of canons may be
written by the Supreme Court, but should be subject to searching inquiry and disapproval or
amendment by Congress. The result of this joint effort—which at long last may render statutory
interpretation consistent and predictable—should be called the Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation.”).
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resignations from those who felt uncomfortable with the mandated
methodological framework.
Methodology can be conceptualized in two alternative ways: one
that treats methods as substantive rules of decision and one that
treats methods as akin to the procedural rules already codified by
171
Congress. Both have significant weaknesses, which I address in this
Note to further highlight the benefits of thinking about methods of
172
interpretation as part of the art of judging.
First, if federal judges’ methods of interpretation were mainly
substantive in nature, they might be unconstitutional under Erie
173
principles. Federal judges sit on courts of limited jurisdiction, with a
mandate of restraint. Outside of a few specific areas, federal courts do
174
not have the authority to create general common law. Suits brought
pursuant to “arising under” jurisdiction generally ask judges to
interpret and apply the federal laws that form the basis of the claim.
The interpretive methodologies used to accomplish this task,
however, are not equivalent to the substantive laws being interpreted.
Judges have never treated interpretive methodology as substantive
law. Although the Supreme Court has occasionally laid down a
175
narrow test for discerning an Establishment Clause violation, a First
176
Amendment violation, or the like, it has never called for stare

171. The question of how to conceptualize the discrete acts of judging is critical not only
because it may determine the constraints put upon judging, but also because it affects the
“attitude” of judging. See Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch: An Essay on
Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 246 (1990) (“[C]alling a rule ‘procedural’ is a rhetorical
strategy . . . to bring about changed attitudes on the part of judges.”).
172. See Frankfurter, supra note 166, at 530 (analogizing interpretation to an art that
required his emulation of the “great masters”).
173. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1937) (“There is no federal general
common law . . . . [T]he doctrine of [Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842),] is, as Mr. Justice
Holmes said, ‘an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no
lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.’” (quoting
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S.
518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
174. Id. at 78.
175. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1970) (“First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government
entanglement with religion.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Waltz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664,
674 (1970))).
176. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1918) (“The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”).
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This traditional
decisis effect for interpretive methodologies.
understanding of interpretive methodologies undermines any claim
that methodologies are substantive lawmaking, even if they have an
effect on the substantive outcome in a case.
Despite the federal courts’ reluctance to treat interpretive rules
as substantive “law” for the purposes of Erie, Professor Gluck argues
178
that perhaps they should. At a minimum, she argues, Erie should be
read to require Article III courts to apply state interpretive
179
She notes, “The
methodologies to state statutory questions.
possibility that certain constitutional considerations might justify a
federal court’s refusal to apply a specific state interpretive rule (or all
of them) does not undermine the argument that, when not
preempted, the baseline established by Erie is that federal courts will
180
apply state legal principles in state-law cases.” Although Professor
Gluck’s point is undoubtedly true, this Note argues that constitutional
principles do preempt any application of state interpretive principles.
If that constitutional argument is correct, then the potential
application of Erie becomes irrelevant.
It would be good practice for federal judges engaged in statutory
interpretation to consider a state’s interpretive-methodological
choices as embodied in a decision from the state’s highest court or an
act from the state’s legislature. If a state has adopted a particular
method of interpretation, then that methodological choice forms a
background principle against which the state legislature acts. Such
181
information is relevant to a judge’s task of statutory interpretation.
That a methodological choice is relevant, however, does not mean
that one can constitutionally mandate Article III judges to follow it,
if—as I suggest—methodology is an inherent power guaranteed by
the Constitution.

177. Cf. Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare
Decisis as Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 709 (2008) (“The Court
would improve predictability in the same way that it enhances predictability in traditional
applications of stare decisis by solidifying statutory interpretation subdecisions with stare
decisis.”).
178. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the
Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1997 (2011).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1959.
181. See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) (noting that Congress legislates
against a background of legal principles and is assumed to incorporate those principles when it
acts, an analysis that the Supreme Court would also likely apply in the context of state
legislation).
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Second, if one views interpretive methodologies as mere
182
procedural mechanisms, then Congress must be able to abrogate
these methodologies in favor of a legislatively endorsed framework.
Professor Rosenkranz takes this position. He proposes the creation of
“Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation” analogous to the codified
183
Federal Rules of Evidence. Like canons of statutory interpretation,
common-law evidence rules were developed by the federal courts to
promote public policy in judicial resolution of cases—rules that were
184
eventually codified, with some modifications, by Congress.
Although individual canons of statutory construction may resemble
rules of evidence, a textualist or purposivist methodology as a whole
does not. A methodology provides tools—in the form of canons of
construction—to prioritize information, but it also relies heavily on
judges to provide the discerning eye and judgment call. Importantly,
it requires a broader vision of a judge’s role in the legal system than
does the average Federal Rule of Evidence. Thus, the comparison is
inapposite.
If one accepts this Note’s view of interpretive freedom, it
becomes evident that interpretation is part and parcel of this essential
185
judicial function. As discussed in Part I, “Under the doctrine of
inherent powers, the courts have the power, in addition to those
powers expressly enumerated in constitutional and statutory
provisions, to do all things reasonably necessary for the exercise of
186
their functions as courts.” A key function of the federal courts is to
187
serve as interpreters of ambiguous provisions in federal law.
Interpretive deliberation is a major part of the decisionmaking
process of judges, a process that scholars and judges struggle to

182. Often, those who view methodologies as merely procedural find the judicial-craft view I
advance to be overly romantic or naïve. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 891 (2003) (“Our critique . . . is that the
common law style of interpretation presupposes a fanciful, even romantic account of judicial
capacities, and also fails to ask questions about likely legislative responses to different judicial
approaches.”).
183. Rosenkranz, supra note 47, at 2107–08.
184. Id.
185. See Jellum, supra note 49, at 895–96 (“Assume that Congress enacted a general
interpretive directive that required the rule of lenity to be ignored for all statutes in the penal
code. Again, Congress is not trying to influence interpretation to further specific policy choices
that it reached only after a deliberative process. Instead, Congress’s main motivation with such a
statute is to control the interpretive process . . . .”).
186. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, supra note 78, § 305.
187. See supra Part II.A–B.
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188

reduce to a formula. Efforts to rein in the methodological freedom
of federal judges burden their exposition of the law. Though judges
could conceivably follow a methodological framework established by
someone else, to impose this kind of restriction would be to replace
their role with the role of the very “machine-tenders” that they were
189
not intended to be.
Although efforts to infringe on judges’ inherent powers are not
190
per se unconstitutional, methodological choices are so intimately
connected with judges’ thought processes that limits on them raise
191
serious constitutional questions. In Michaelson v. United States, the
Supreme Court held: “[T]he attributes which inhere in [the inherent
judicial] power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated
nor rendered practically inoperative. That it may be regulated within
192
limits not precisely defined may not be doubted.” The Michaelson
Court examined the inherent judicial power of contempt and
ultimately upheld a regulation requiring jury trials for some cases of
193
contempt. Contempt is more closely analogous to the power of
interpretation than many of the other powers recognized as
“inherent” to the judiciary because it involves a subjective
determination made to further the judge’s exercise of his
constitutional power. It is hard to imagine, however, that any of the
proposals to restrict methodology would satisfy the Michaelson
standard. The very act of interfering with a judge’s consideration of
evidence strikes at the heart of the judicial power in a way that goes
beyond a mere limitation. Interpretation cannot easily be regulated
without essentially abrogating the freedom that is critical to the
judge’s independent decisionmaking.

188. See Lipshaw, supra note 157, at 11–14 (“Nobody outside the mind of the being
knows . . . what the basis of the judgment really is. . . . Something is going on in there, but we
have no way of knowing precisely what it is.”).
189. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
190. Evidence rules, for example, infringe on a judge’s ability to control the admission of
evidence but are permissible to the extent that they merely supplement—rather than supplant—
judicial interpretations of the Constitution. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437
(2000) (“Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created
rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution. But Congress may
not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.” (citations
omitted)).
191. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
192. Id. at 66.
193. Id. at 70–71.
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As this Section has shown, the task of constitutional
interpretation is an essentially judicial task—an art of sorts. It
requires judges to bring their experience and judgment to bear upon
open questions of federal law. The methods of interpretation they use
to decide the case are neither wholly procedural nor wholly
substantive. They are best thought of as philosophical approaches to
the art of interpretation. The Framers entrusted this task to judges,
protecting judges’ ability to act without personal pressure from
politicians in the other branches. Yet even more is in jeopardy than
an individual judge’s power to fulfill his constitutional functions:
methodological constraints threaten the ability of the judiciary as a
194
whole to serve its constitutional role. As the next Section discusses,
courts must guard those powers that are essential to their broader
195
function as a member of a tripartite government.
B. Independent Interpretation as the Most Powerful Judicial Check
The previous Section focused on the nature of the judicial
function. This Section advances a companion argument: that
proposed methodological constraints are a threat to judicial
independence. This independence is important not only to maintain
judicial integrity, but also to enable judges to serve their
constitutional checking function. The strength of federal protections
for judicial independence is fairly unique when compared to the
196
protections for state judiciaries. As Part II.A described, the Framers
were acutely aware of the problems caused by political influences on
197
judges. Such influences could corrode the strength of the decisions
themselves, in addition to affecting the judiciary’s ability to resist
198
tyrannical whims of the political branches. Independence is thus the

194. Justice Breyer gave an address on the importance of judicial independence. He noted,
Constitutional guarantees of tenure and compensation may well help secure
judicial independence, but they can by no means assure it. Ultimately independence is
a matter of custom, habit, and institutional expectation. To build those customs,
habits, and expectations requires time and support—not only from the bench and bar
but from the community where the judges serve.
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 903, 904 (2007).
195. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, supra note 78, § 305 (“The courts have, and should
maintain vigorously, all the inherent and implied powers necessary properly and effectively to
function as a separate department of government.”).
196. See Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, with One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
2008, at A1 (reporting that “thirty-nine states elect at least some of their judges”).
197. See supra Part II.A.
198. See supra Part II.A.
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hook on which the Framers decided to hang their judicial hat. Efforts
to rein in interpretive freedom threaten this quality of the federal
judiciary.
The freedom to adopt a method of interpretation is necessary to
the independent interpretation of the laws. As the last Section
explained, methodologies are intimately connected to the
decisionmaking process. Independence ensures that those
methodologies are employed without external influence. This is
particularly important in hard cases, when methodological choices
will likely affect the outcome. Judges must be free to focus on
adjudicating such cases within the constraints of their visions of the
Constitution. Meddling with methodology would be just as
detrimental to judicial integrity as the salary-based threats that
preoccupied the Framers.
The scholarship on judicial independence demonstrates
overwhelming support for this concept, though much of it focuses on
199
more obvious threats to the judiciary. Interpretation may not be the

199. See, e.g., David J. Beck, Judicial Independence: Woe to the Generation That Judges the
Judges, 71 TEX. B.J. 572, 575 (2008) (“To preserve the integrity of our independent judiciary, we
must ensure that they are given the tools to do their job. We owe it to our judiciary and the
many men and women who have made a financial sacrifice to serve, to preserve for future
generations a system in which judges decide cases free of bias or intimidation.”); Stephen B.
Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO.
L.J. 909, 927 (2007) (“For, if judges forget that their independence exists for the benefit of the
judiciary as a whole—and ultimately, of course, for the benefit of our system of government—
they may discover that, in the world of power politics, the reality of judicial independence does
not match the rhetoric.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection
and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 1007–08 (2007) (“The strong institutional
independence of Article III judges anchors the legal infrastructure that accommodates elected
judges in the state courts with the rule of law. This anchoring role of the Article III judiciary
provides added reason why proposals to jettison central features of the traditional structure of
federal judicial independence should be evaluated with great caution.”); Pamela S. Karlan,
Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1059 (2007) (“Put more generally, judicial
independence is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means of ensuring freedom and the rule of
law. Thus, in explaining and arguing for ‘judicial independence,’ we need to ask quite carefully
what constraints judges ought to be free from, and what constraints judges ought to be bound
by.”); Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 700–
01 (1980) (“If we are to remain true to the Framers’ plan for a government bound at all levels by
the rule of law, we must resist even well-intentioned legislation that would chill the capacity of
the judge to render impartial justice. Judicial independence is not a cliché conjured up by those
who seek to prevent encroachments by the other branches of government. The term is one of
art, defined to achieve the essential objective of the separation of powers that justice be
rendered without fear or bias, and free of prejudice.”). But see Paul D. Carrington & Roger C.
Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 587, 589–90 (2009) (“It is unlikely that any judge ever sat on a law court
enjoying more independence than the present Justices themselves have enjoyed. . . . [T]he
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first subject one considers when attempting to cabin judicial power. In
2009, District Court Judge Lee West gave an address about threats to
judicial independence, focusing his remarks on threats in the form of
200
a court-packing plan, efforts to overturn or denigrate judicial
201
decisions in the public sphere,
executive refusals to follow
202
established law, and the politicization of the Department of
203
Justice. But constraints on methodology are more insidious and
equally pernicious threats to judicial independence. Methodologies
204
can and do affect case outcomes, so a binding methodological
framework would necessarily prevent judges from deciding cases as
their philosophies and experiences might otherwise dictate. This
phenomenon
would
fundamentally
alter
federal
judges’
constitutionally created isolation, making them subordinate to the
legislature or the fellow judges who created the framework.
Although Part I identified inherent powers to include the full
scope of implied or ancillary powers discussed in the literature, not all
205
of these powers enjoy the same constitutional protection. Many
powers deemed inherent by the courts create only the first-mover
206
advantage, leaving another branch with the final say. Nevertheless,
Justices have indulged their independence to make law that has seriously impaired the
independence of the many judges sitting on state courts.”); William H. Pryor, Jr., Not-SoSerious Threats to Judicial Independence, 93 VA. L. REV. 1759, 1762–63 (2007) (“I submit that
the independence of the federal judiciary today is as secure as ever. The current criticisms of the
judiciary are relatively mild and, on balance, a benefit to the judiciary.”).
200. Lee R. West, Speech, Judicial Independence: Our Fragile Fortress Against Elective
Tyranny, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 59, 62–63 (2009).
201. See id. at 63–65 (explaining how Congress attempted to bypass state court decisions
regarding Terri Schiavo’s life).
202. See id. at 67 (“[I]n the landmark case of [Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)],
the Supreme Court held that the military commissions created by President Bush to try
Guantanamo detainees failed to comply with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the
Geneva Conventions.” (footnote omitted)).
203. Id. at 72.
204. See Francisco J. Benzoni & Christopher S. Dodrill, Does Judicial Philosophy Matter? A
Case Study, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 287, 330 (2011) (“The very structure of this
study . . . . demonstrates that these judges were likely driven to their diverse conclusions at least
in part because they adhere to diverse judicial philosophies.”).
205. See Beale, supra note 100, at 1472 (asserting that Congress has the final say over courts’
formulations of procedural rules through its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, and its Article III authority to establish the lower federal courts); id. at
1472–73 (suggesting that the executive may also have a say in procedural rules to “preserve[] the
essential functions of each branch” (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974))
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
206. See id. at 1472 (“If the implied ancillary authority of the executive and the judiciary
under articles II and III is given a generous interpretation, it will overlap with the legislative
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some inherent powers may be so essential to the function of the
judicial branch that neither Congress nor the executive can supersede
207
them. Although rarely deciding these cases under the inherentpower doctrine, the courts have repeatedly rejected legislative
208
infringements on their essential function. The classic justification for
these decisions is the maintenance of the separation of powers.
For judicial review to serve as a check on the other branches, the
209
judiciary must be able to act separately and independently. If
Congress can dictate favorable outcomes in the courts through
legislation, then the courts are no bulwark against the excesses of that
branch, nor are they a deterrent. As Justice Jackson said 160 years
after ratification,
[W]hen a ruling majority has put its commands in statutory form, we
have considered that the interpretation of their fair meaning and
their application to individual cases should be made by judges as
independent of politics as humanly possible and not serving the
interests of the class for whom, or a majority by whom, legislation is
210
enacted.

Though the lack of consensus in the federal system may have
211
drawbacks, the erosion of the judiciary’s independence has greater
authority under the necessary and proper clause. This does not pose a substantial problem,
however. In the case of a conflict, the text of the necessary and proper clause reflects the
expectation that Congress would enact laws to govern the other branches of government.”).
207. A law or executive action which substantially prevents the judiciary from performing its
constitutional function will always be a threat to the separation of powers.
208. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“[The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, invalidated by City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)] was designed to control cases and controversies, such as
the one before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond
congressional authority, it is this Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control. . . . Broad
as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal
balance.”).
209. This point echoes Madison’s refrain at the Constitutional Convention: “If it be a
fundamental principle of free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should
be separately exercised; it is equally so that they be independently exercised.” 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 126, at 56.
210. Robert J. Jackson, Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 123 (1949).
211. For an argument that the lack of consensus in the federal system is actually a positive
attribute, see generally Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory
Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/7/30/leib_serota
.html. That essay suggests that the tension among methodological philosophies promotes more
deliberative decisionmaking and opinion writing, two practices that greatly benefit the law that
emerges from American courts. Id. at 50.
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costs. In common-law England, the judiciary was subservient to the
king, who had delegated his power to its use. Under the U.S. system,
however, the judiciary ought not to be subservient to either of its
coequal branches. Thus, at a minimum, neither of the political
branches should be able to impose a methodological framework on
the judicial branch. The establishment of such frameworks by higher
courts may burden the independence of particular judges—which of
course is what the salary and life-tenure privileges protect—but it
does not implicate the major concern of the Framers with preventing
political influence. Rather, such intrabranch efforts to bind judges are
inconsistent with the arguments advanced in the previous Section.
C. Some Objections
Several objections to my thesis can be raised. One criticism is
that the very novelty of the argument may indicate its frailty. After
all, Professor Gluck cites states that have had at least some success
implementing binding methodological frameworks. Many of these
states have constitutions with provisions analogous to those in the
federal Constitution. Why should federal judges be different from
state judges? To this question I have two responses. First, the
struggles over the creation of these methodologies, and particularly
over their legislative introduction in Texas and Connecticut, are
consonant with my thesis. The state judges in those case studies made
212
statements objecting to the infringement of their judicial power.
Second, the “success” stories all rested on the introduction of the
methodology by the state supreme court, a path that may not be
feasible in the federal system. The Madisonian Compromise left open
the possibility that all Article III power would remain vested in the
Supreme Court, but it also vested that power in those Article III
213
courts yet to be created. Thus, Article III judges may have a
different set of rights and responsibilities than the judges in Professor
Gluck’s case studies, derived not only from the Constitution’s Vesting
214
Clause, but also from the historical mandate described in Part II.B.
Another criticism may be that if the vast majority of other
inherent judicial powers can be constrained, then methodology

212. See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
213. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”).
214. Id.
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should also be subject to such restrictions. As this Note has shown,
however, methodology is different. Although, at first blush, methods
of interpretation might seem analogous to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, their origins and context set them apart. Most methods of
interpretation originate in a judge’s view of the proper role for
federal judges in the constitutional scheme. They are necessary for
one of the most important tasks that federal judges undertake—
providing the definitive statement of a law’s meaning. The intimate
connection between judicial philosophy and interpretive outcomes
suggests that interpretive methodology reaches to the very essence of
what it means to be a federal judge.
The Supreme Court has not had occasion to confront legislative
abrogation of methodological freedom directly, but the issues raised
by such abrogation bear many parallels to the issues addressed in the
215
Court’s 1996 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores. In that case,
216
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
aimed at essentially overruling the Supreme Court’s test for Free
217
Exercise Clause violations. RFRA attempted to reintroduce the
218
substantial-burden balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner. The Court
rejected this effort as both beyond the scope of the Section Five
enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment and a violation of
219
the separation of powers. Although Congress could limit its own
zone of action based upon a strict interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause—at least until some future Congress amended the Statute—it
could not declare that interpretation to be constitutionally required
and impose it upon state and local governments. If the Court rebuffed
this more targeted attempt to infringe judicial deliberation, then it
would likely also reject a broader attempt to impose a binding
method of interpretation on the courts.
CONCLUSION
As the U.S. Code expands, the interpretive role of Article III
judges only continues to grow in scope and importance. Though there
may be rule-of-law benefits to greater methodological uniformity,
215. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1996).
216. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488,
invalidated by Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
217. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512–13.
218. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
219. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
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those benefits cannot be pursued at the cost of the Constitution. As
this Note has shown, the Framers included several constitutional
provisions to insulate judges from the machinations of the other
branches. They believed that judicial independence was important for
the integrity of the system and focused on the two ways that a judge’s
independence would most likely be infringed. But threatening a
judge’s job or salary is not the only way to infringe his independence.
One can also burden the judge’s ability to fulfill his role through
methodological constraints. Such constraints threaten the ability of
judges to independently arrive at a conclusion about what the words
in a statute mean and about what Congress thought the statute would
mean. In a very real sense, proposals that dictate a particular
methodological framework strike at the heart of what the Framers
intended federal judges to do.
If fulfilling the constitutional vision of Article III judging
requires some freedom of interpretation, then the next question is,
How big is this zone of freedom? Is there no overlap of authority for
Congress or the Supreme Court to create uniformity in the system?
Though a full consideration of such authority is beyond the scope of
this Note, the principles I advance suggest that neither of those bodies
should be in the business of establishing a general framework of
interpretation for federal judges.
This Note thus puts in writing what has long been understood.
One of the most fundamental tasks of federal judges is to bring their
independent wisdom and judgment to bear in interpretation. The
imposition of a rigid methodological framework is an interesting idea
for academic scholarship, but it raises serious constitutional
difficulties that should not be ignored for the sake of a theoretically
appealing proposal. The essence of judging, at least on the federal
level, requires freedom of interpretation.

